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Jake	Goldenfein*
‘Profiling’	means	different	things	in	different	traditions.	The	proliferation	of	machine	learning	
and	data	science	in	profiling	however,	make	the	European	General	Data	Protection	Regulation	
(GDPR)	 definition	 especially	 meaningful.1	 Under	 that	 regime,	 ‘profiling’	 includes	 the	
automated	evaluation	of	certain	traits	about	a	person,2	reminding	us	of	the	legal	significance	
of	‘classification’	even	without	subsequent	discrimination.	This	definition	also	applies	to	an	
emerging	class	of	automated	image-based	profiling	technologies	that	evaluate	‘traits’	about	
individuals.	‘Computer	vision’	techniques	‘make	sense’	of	image	or	video	data	by	measuring,	
using	 machine	 learning	 to	 transform	 those	 measurements	 into	 ‘representations’,	 and	
subsequently	into	decisions	and	classifications.	The	‘online	profiling’	discussed	over	the	past	
several	 decades,	 typically	 concerned	 knowledge	 production	 from	 ‘transaction	 generated	
information’	created	by	interacting	with	informational	environments,3	framing	individuals	in	
terms	of	proxies	and	scores.4	Computer	vision	(and	other	biometric)	techniques	however,	use	
extremely	 granular	 measurements	 of	 ‘the	 real	 world’	 and	 increasingly	 deploy	 a	 logic	 of	
exposing	or	revealing	the	truth	of	reality	and	people	within	it.	This	article	explores	the	nature	
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1	See	e.g.	Isak	Mendoza	and	Lee	Bygrave,	‘The	Right	not	to	be	subject	to	Automated	Decisions	based	on	
Profiling’	in	Taitani	Synodinou	et	al	(eds)	EU	Internet	Law:	Regulation	and	Enforcement	(Springer	2017);	
Dimitra	Kamarinou,	Christopher	Millard,	and	Jatinder	Singh,	‘Machine	Learning	with	Personal	Data’	(2016)	
Queen	Mary	University	of	London	School	of	Law	Legal	Studies	Research	Paper	247/2016;	Fred	H.	Cate	et	al,	
‘Machine	Learning	with	Personal	Data:	Is	Data	Protection	Law	Smart	Enough	to	Meet	the	Challenge?’	(2017)	
Articles	by	Maurer	Faculty	2634.	
2	REGULATION	(EU)	No	2016/679	OF	THE	EUROPEAN	PARLIAMENT	AND	OF	THE	COUNCIL	of	27	April	2016	on	
the	protection	of	natural	persons	with	regard	to	the	processing	of	personal	data	and	on	the	free	movement	of	
such	data,	and	repealing	Directive	95/46/EC	(General	Data	Protection	Regulation).	OJ	L	119	(2016-05-04),	1–
88,	Article	4.	
3	Oscar	H	Gandy	Jr,	‘Statistical	Surveillance:	Remote	Sensing	in	the	Digital	Age’	in	Kristie	Ball,	Kevin	D	Haggerty	
and	David	Lyon	(eds)	Routledge	Handbook	of	Surveillance	Studies	(Routledge	2012).	
4	See	e.g.	Bernard	Harcourt,	Exposed:	Desire	and	Disobedience	in	the	Digital	Age	(Harvard	University	Press,	
2015)	discussing	‘doppelganger	logic’,	as	well	as	Danielle	Keats	Citron	and	Frank	Pasquale,	‘The	Scored	Society:	
Due	Process	for	Automated	Predictions’	(2014)	89	Washington	law	Review	1.	
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of	those	knowledge	claims	and	what	might	be	the	appropriate	register	of	legal	intervention	
to	address	data	science’s	dominance	as	a	paradigm	for	knowing	people.	
	
Computer	vision	generates	classifications	and	knowledge	about	scenes,	objects,	events	and	
people.	 Computer	 vision	 is	 not	 the	 only	 domain	 of	 data	 science	 articulating	 this	 new	
epistemological	stance.	Similar	ideas	are	evident	in	numerous	data	science	applications,	often	
those	involving	biometrics.	Computer	vision	does	however,	provides	a	useful	entry	point	into	
what	is	qualitatively	new	about	the	empirical	and	epistemological	position	being	developed.	
When	 applied	 to	 people,	 computer	 vision	 has	 clear	 legal	 and	 social	 significance.	 Facial	
recognition	 for	 instance,	one	such	notorious	application,	 links	a	person’s	portrait	 to	 some	
form	 of	 institutional	 identity	 like	 a	 driver’s	 licence.5	 By	 connecting	 an	 individual	 to	 their	
behaviour	 in	 physical	 space,	 facial	 recognition	 couples	 identity	 across	 physical	 and	
computational	 registers,	 enabling	 automated	 decisions	 to	 be	 articulated	 into	 physical	
environments.6	 Both	 the	 intrinsic	 limitations	 and	 problematic	 applications	 of	 these	
technologies	are	well	documented,7	with	calls	for	regulation	not	far	behind.8	However,	there	
is	 already	 much	 more	 that	 computer	 vision	 can	 do	 when	 ‘looking	 at	 people’.9	 Beyond	
‘identification’,	computer	vision	can	also	‘classify’	people.10	As	well	as	linking	your	image	and	
spatial	location	to	an	institutional	identity,	computer	vision	can	make	decisions	about	non-
visual	 attributes	 such	 as	what	 type	of	 person	 you	 are,	what	 you	 are	doing,	what	 you	 are	
feeling,	and	how	you	are	likely	to	act	in	the	future.	These	decisions	may	be	about	identity,	
																																																						
5	See	e.g.	Jordan	G	Teicher,	‘What	Do	Facial	Recognition	Technologies	Mean	for	our	Privacy?’	New	York	Times	
(18	July	2018)	<https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/lens/what-do-facial-recognition-technologies-mean-
for-our-privacy.html>;	Clare	Garvie,	Alvaro	Bedoya,	and	Jonathan	Frankle,	‘The	Perpetual	Lineup:	Unregulated	
Police	Face	Recognition	in	America’	(18	October	2018)	<https://www.perpetuallineup.org/>;	Monique	Mann	
and	Marcus	Smith,	‘Automated	Facial	Recognition	Technology:	Recent	Developments	and	Approaches	to	
Oversight’	(2017)	40(1)	University	of	New	South	Wales	Law	Journal	121.		
6	A	similar	process	happens	with	vehicle	registration	and	automated	number	plate	recognition.	See	e.g.	James	
Bridle,	‘How	Britain	Exported	Next-Generation	Surveillance’	(18	December	2013)	
<https://medium.com/matter/how-britain-exported-next-generation-surveillance-d15b5801b79e>.		
7	See	e.g.	Robin	Kramer	and	Ray	Ritchie,	‘The	Trouble	with	Facial	Recognition	technology	(in	the	real	world)’,	
The	Conversation	(14	December	2016);	Mike	Orcutt,	‘Are	Face	Recognition	Systems	Accurate?	Depends	on	
Your	Race);	MIT	Technology	Review	(6	July	2016)	<https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601786/are-face-
recognition-systems-accurate-depends-on-your-race/>.		
8	See	e.g.	Jonathan	Vanian,	‘Microsoft	President:	Facial	Recognition	Technology	Needs	Government	
Regulation’	Fortune	(13	July	2018)	<http://fortune.com/2018/07/13/microsoft-facial-recognition-regulation/>.		
9	The	term	‘looking	at	people’	is	an	umbrella	for	research	on	computer	vision	applied	to	persons,	see	e.g.	
Sergio	Escalera	et	al,	‘ChaLearn	Looking	at	People:	A	Review	of	Events	and	Resources’	Proceedings	of	the	2017	
International	Joint	Conference	on	Neural	Networks	(IJCNN	2017),	IEEE,	2017.	
10	Gandy,	above	n	3.	
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gender,	emotional	 state	or	 future	behaviours.	But	more	controversial	 classifiers	have	also	
addressed	 questions	 of	 sexuality,	 criminal	 propensity,	 political	 position,	 IQ,	 workplace	
suitability,	and	paedophilic	 tendencies.11	That	 type	of	 ‘computational	physiognomy’	 is	one	
element	 of	 an	 emerging	 field	 of	 ‘personality	 computation’,	 often	 described	 as	 Apparent	
Personality	Analysis	(APA)	or	Apparent	Personality	Recognition	(APR).12		
	
Personality	 computation	uses	 faces,	 postures,	movements,	 actions,	 gestures,	 interactions,	
and	emotions	(as	well	as	whether	those	emotions	and	expressions	are	real	or	fake)	to	infer	
personality	traits.13	Different	analytic	techniques	operate	on	different	data	inputs.	Some	use	
dynamic	 information	 such	 as	 what	 a	 person	 does,	 or	 the	 way	 a	 physical	 morphology	
changes.14	 Some	 use	 static	 information	 such	 as	 how	 a	 person	 looks.	 Some	 use	 multiple	
modalities	–	like	combinations	of	visual	and	audio	data	in	different	configurations.	Whatever	
the	 particular	 decision	 or	 classification,	 the	 premise	 of	 these	 techniques	 is	 generating	
knowledge	by	applying	data	science	to	images	in	a	way	that	transforms	measurements	of	the	
world	in	the	form	of	pixel	vectors	into	classifications.		
	
The	 scientific	 merit	 of	 computer	 vision	 profiling,	 especially	 when	 applied	 to	 non-visual	
characteristics	of	persons,	has	been	rigorously	challenged.15	But	the	scientific	validity	of	these	
projects	is	not	the	focus	of	this	article.	As	Ian	Hacking	reminds	us,	there	is	a	long	history	of	
producing	 social	 knowledge	 through	 new	 systems	 of	 measurement,	 both	 at	 the	 level	 of	
groups	 and	 individuals,	 and	 that	 ‘new	 classifications	 and	 new	 enumerations	 are	
inseparable’.16	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	 article	 is	 therefore	 to	 examine	 those	 systems	 of	
																																																						
11	Yilun	Wang	and	Michal	Kosinski,	‘Deep	Neural	Networks	are	More	Accurate	than	Humans	at	Detecting	
Sexual	Orientation	from	Facial	Images’	(2018)	114(2)	Innovations	in	Social	Psychology	246;	See	e.g.	
https://www.faception.com/.	
12	Julio	C.S.	Jacques	Junior	et	al,	‘First	Impressions:	A	Survey	on	Computer	Vision-Based	Apparent	Personality	
Trait	Analysis’,	arXiv:1804.08046v1	[cs.CV]	(21	Apr	2018).		
13	Ibid.	
14	See	e.g.	Anna	Hoffman	and	Luke	Stark,	‘Hard	Feelings	–	Inside	Out,	Silicon	Valley,	and	Why	Technologizing	
Emotion	and	Memory	is	a	Dangerous	Idea’	(11	September	2015)	LA	Review	of	Books,	available	
<https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/hard-feelings-inside-out-silicon-valley-and-why-technologizing-emotion-
and-memory-is-a-dangerous-idea/>	where	they	discuss	the	problems	of	Paul	Elkman’s	‘Facial	Action	Coding	
System’,	which	measured	the	way	people’s	faces	change	when	they	express	emotions,	suggesting	the	use	of	
dynamic	information	does	not	necessarily	solve	any	problems.	
15	See	e.g.	Blaise	Agüera	y	Arcas,	Margaret	Mitchell,	and	Alexander	Todorov,	‘Physiognomy’s	new	Clothes’	(7	
May	2017)	<https://medium.com/@blaisea/physiognomys-new-clothes-f2d4b59fdd6a>;	Frank	Pasquale,	
‘When	Machine	Learning	is	Facially	Invalid’	(2018)	61(9)	Communications	of	the	ACM	24.	
16	Ian	Hacking,	The	Taming	of	Chance	(Cambridge	University	Press	1990),	53.	
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enumeration	 and	 classification,	 try	 and	 understand	 the	 basis	 on	 which	 they	 produce	
knowledge	 about	 people,	 and	 explain	 why	 this	 presents	 unique	 challenges.	 The	 profiling	
exercises	outlined	here	are	thus	presented	as	examples	of	the	shift	towards	computational	
empiricism	or	positivism	as	a	dominant	knowledge	system	likely	to	have	ongoing	effects	in	
juridical	and	political	practices.	While	the	knowledge	claims	of	computer	vision	profiling	are	
often	modest	or	tentative,	in	certain	papers	authors	have	begun	to	argue	that	only	through	
computation	are	we	able	to	access	all	the	information	available	in	human	faces	and	truly	know	
people.	In	other	words,	only	through	computation	can	the	excesses	of	the	physical	world	and	
the	people	within	it	be	perceived,	processed	and	understood.		
	
While	the	trope	that	technology	facilitates	greater	knowledge	of	nature	is	a	familiar	one,	it	
still	 requires	 close	 analysis	 in	 the	 specific	 context	 of	 computer	 vision.	 That	 analysis	 has	
become	more	imperative	in	the	context	of	Trevor	Paglen’s	identification	that	‘Human	visual	
culture	has	become	a	special	case	of	vision,	and	exception	to	the	rule’	in	a	situation	where	
actually	 ‘The	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	 images	 are	 now	 made	 by	 machines	 for	 other	
machines’.17	While	computer	vision	‘images’	may	be	increasingly	‘invisible’,	they	still	operate	
within	 the	dynamics	of	 representation	and	knowledge,	 and	 they	 still	 interact	with	human	
visuality.	 Western	 thought	 has	 spent	 a	 good	 deal	 of	 time	 reflecting	 on	 ‘the	 connection	
between	actuality	and	photo’,18	as	well	as	the	consequences	of	 living	 in	a	world	coded	by	
undecipherable	 ‘technical	 images’.19	 This	 material	 offers	 a	 useful	 touchstone	 for	
understanding	 the	 computer	 vision	 project	 of	 ‘looking	 at	 people’,	 and	 its	 political	 and	
epistemological	consequences.	While	there	has	been	a	great	deal	of	exceptional	work	on	the	
problematic	application	of	computer	vision	technologies,	the	goal	of	this	article	is	thus	less	
about	exposing	bias	or	lack	of	fairness,	and	more	about	understanding	the	‘programs’	of	the	
computer	 vision	 ‘apparatus’.20	 Rather	 than	 challenge	 computer	 vision	 at	 the	 level	 of	
																																																						
17	Trevor	Paglen,	‘Invisible	Images	(Your	Pictures	are	Looking	at	You)’	The	New	Inquiry	(8	December	2016)	
<https://thenewinquiry.com/invisible-images-your-pictures-are-looking-at-you/>.	
18	Walter	Benjamin,	‘A	Short	History	of	Photography	1934)’	in	Alan	Trachtenberg	(ed)	Classic	Essays	on	
Photography	(Leete	Island	Books	1980).		
19	Vilém	Flusser	Towards	a	Philosophy	of	Photography	(Anthony	Mathews	trans	in	Reaktion	Books	2000)	
originally	published	as	Für	Eine	Philosophie	der	Fotographie	(European	Photography	1983). 	
20	Ibid,	these	terms	are	intended	to	follow	the	definitions	provided	by	Vilém	Flusser,	the	book	includes	a	
Glossary:	At	(83)	‘Apparatus	(pi.	-es):	a	plaything	or	game	that	simulates	thought	[trans.	An	overarching	term	
for	a	non-human	agency,	e.g.	the	camera,	the	computer	and	the	'apparatus'	of	the	State	or	of	the	market];	
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problematic	applications,	this	article	instead	argues	that,	to	avoid	becoming	a	vector	of	data	
science’s	 politics	 of	 completion,	 legal	 narratives	 should	 highlight	 the	 fundamental	
contingency	of	computational	empiricism	and	its	knowledge	claims.		
	
This	 article	 begins	 with	 a	 historical	 and	 technological	 contextualisation	 of	 personality	
computation.	It	looks	at	similar	exercises	from	the	past,	and	tracks	the	history	of	combining	
photographic	 portraiture	with	 statistical	 analyses.	 That	 section	 demonstrates	 the	 ongoing	
ideologies	behind	this	type	of	profiling,	and	how	they	are	serviced	by	‘big	data	epistemology’.	
However,	this	is	identified	as	only	one	of	the	political	problems	of	this	type	of	classification	–	
another	 being	 the	 reverence	 for	 the	 forms	 of	 empiricism	 operationalised.	 Through	 the	
historical	 analysis,	 the	 idea	 is	 to	 demonstrate	 not	 how	 statistics	 and	 mathematics	 are	
becoming	instruments	of	real	or	symbolic	violence,	but	rather	the	nature	of	the	change	from	
visual	 to	 statistical	 forms	 of	 knowing.	 The	 article	 then	 seeks	 to	 sketch	 an	 outline	 of	 this	
emerging	computational	empiricism	by	connecting	the	knowledge	claims	of	computer	vision	
profiling	 to	antecedent	media	 technologies.	The	goal	 is	 to	understand	the	ongoing	role	of	
‘representation’	within	 the	 systems	of	measurement	 at	work	 in	 computer	 vision,	 and	 the	
politics	of	their	dissimulation.	Finally,	the	article	explores	possibilities	for	legal	and	technical	
intervention.	 In	 that	 section,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 the	 narratives	 animating	 existing	 legal	
protections	are	becoming	deficient	in	the	face	of	technological	practices	that	see	humans	in	
a	new	way,	primarily	as	patterns	of	information.	Accordingly,	the	article	suggests	that	when	
dealing	 with	 profiling,	 privacy	 and	 data	 protection	 now	 need	 to	 focus	 as	 much	 on	
‘metaphysics’	as	they	do	on	‘metadata’.21	Rather	than	the	elimination	of	bias	or	unfairness,	
or	the	total	prohibition	of	certain	applications	(both	of	which	have	their	place	within	 legal	
armatures),	the	argument	here	is	for	legal	mechanisms	that	marginalize	purely	computational	
ways	of	knowing.	The	goal	is	not	to	‘put	the	genie	back	in	the	bottle’	but	rather	highlight	and	
contest	the	ontological	power	of	computer	vision	when	classifying	people.22	
	
																																																						
organization	or	system	that	enables	something	to	function.’	At	(84)	‘Program:	a	combination	game	with	clear	
and	distinct	elements	[trans.	A	term	whose	associations	include	computer	programs,	hence	the	US	spelling].’	
21	Dan	McQuillan,	‘Data	Science	as	Machinic	Neoplatanism’	(2017)	31(2)	Philosophy	&	Technology	253,	263	
where	he	notes	‘With	data	science,	we	have	moved	from	metadata	to	metaphysics;	it	is	an	embedded,	even	
weaponised,	philosophy.’	
22	Rob	Kitchin	and	Martin	Dodge,	Code/Space:	Software	and	Everyday	Life	(MIT	2011),	26.	
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Computer	Vision	Profiling	
	
Computer	vision	 is	a	family	of	technologies	and	practices	by	which	computational	systems	
come	to	understand	and	make	decisions	about	the	physical	world	and	the	people	within	it.	
When	‘looking	at	people’,	applications	range	from	relatively	benign	to	highly	problematic.	The	
more	 problematic	 applications	 do,	 however,	 typically	 reveal	more	 in	 terms	 of	 embedded	
technical,	 ideological,	 and	 epistemological	 assumptions.	 Forms	 of	 computational	 analytics	
have	 been	 used	 in	 personality	 analysis	 since	 the	 1990s.	 But	 the	 history	 of	 combining	
photography	with	statistics	to	explore	correlations	between	external	appearance	and	internal	
personality	goes	back	much	further.	Kate	Crawford	reminds	us	that,	‘If	algorithms	present	us	
with	a	new	knowledge	logic,	then	it	is	important	to	consider	the	contours	of	that	logic	and	by	
which	histories	and	philosophies	 it	 is	most	strongly	shaped.’23	Connecting	computer	vision	
projects	to	previous	photographic	ones	thus	demonstrates	what	lurks	behind	these	systems	
of	human	classification,	and	how	previous	claims	about	the	 ‘mechanical	objectivity’	of	the	
camera	have	been	displaced	into	the	computational	objectivity	of	statistics.	But	rather	than	
demonstrate	how	data	science	can	be	a	vector	for	ideology,	the	goal	is	to	demonstrate	what	
else	 is	at	stake	 in	the	computer	vision	project	when	 ‘looking	at	people’	–	 in	particular	 the	
proliferation	 of	 computational	 empiricism,	 the	 difference	 between	 visual	 and	 statistical	
knowledge,	 and	 the	 idea	 that	 data	 science	 can	 know	 people	 better	 than	 they	 know	
themselves.	
	
Classification	and	Ideology	
	
Criminal	portraits	were	one	of	the	first	datasets	systematically	produced	after	the	invention	
of	the	daguerreotype	photographic	process.24	Founder	of	British	Eugenics,	bio-metrician,	and	
Charles	Darwin’s	cousin,	Sir	Francis	Galton	used	these	portraits	to	create	‘composite’	images	
intended	 to	 expose	 the	 ‘mean’	 appearance	 of	 criminality.25	 Both	 phrenology	 and	
																																																						
23	Kate	Crawford,	‘Can	an	Algorithm	be	Agonistic?	Ten	Scenes	from	Life	in	Calculated	Publics’	(2016)	41(1)	
Science,	Technology	&	Human	Values	77,	85-6.	
24	See	e.g.	Jens	Jäger,	‘Photography:	a	means	of	surveillance?	Judicial	Photography	1850	–	1900’	(2001)	5(1)	
Crime,	History	&	Societies	27.	
25	Francis	Galton,	‘Composite	Portraits,	Made	by	Combining	Those	of	Many	Different	Persons	into	a	Single	
Resultant	Figure’	(1879)	3	Journal	of	the	Anthropological	Institute	of	Great	Britain	132.	
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physiognomy	had	already	been	scientifically	discredited	by	the	time	of	Galton’s	experiments	
in	1877.	However,	belief	in	photography’s	‘mechanical	objectivity’	gave	Galton	a	new	(though	
crude)	 statistical	 tool	 to	 investigate	 his	 hypothesis	 of	 biological	 degeneration.26	 Galton’s	
experiments	were	 ultimately	 failures.	 He	 found	 that	 the	 visual	 similarities	 of	 the	 criminal	
classes	 disappeared	 through	 the	 composite	 process	which	 instead	 revealed	 the	 ‘common	
humanity	 in	 all’.27	 Despite	 this	 failure	 however,	 and	 despite	 the	 stigma	 associated	 with	
eugenics	and	‘Social	Darwinism’,	the	experiment	has	been	repeated	using	new	photographic	
techniques,	statistical	methodologies,	and	biological	theories.	One	important	differentiation	
however,	 is	 the	 movement	 in	 knowledge	 paradigm	 from	 qualitative	 visual	 searches	 for	
similarity	amongst	groups	towards	purely	quantitative	statistical	analysis.	
	
In	 parallel	 with	 ongoing	 physiognomic	 experimentation,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 growing	
psychological	literature	exploring	how	‘first	impressions’	are	generated	from	looking	at	faces	
(including	impressions	of	criminality).28	That	material	demonstrates	how	faces	are	a	form	of	
non-verbal	communication	and	part	of	the	intrinsic	heuristics	we	use	to	navigate	daily	social	
interactions.	 However,	 it	 has	 also	 led	 to	 the	 claim	 that	 ‘research	 on	 appearance-based	
[personality	assessment]	might	seem	more	credible	if	society	were	“not	so	enamoured	of	the	
idea	that	because	a	person’s	appearance	ought	not	to	make	a	difference,	it	does	not,”	blaming	
the	dearth	of	this	research	on	the	“naturalistic	fallacy”	(that	is,	confusing	how	things	are	with	
how	they	ought	to	be).’29	In	rejecting	the	‘naturalistic	fallacy’,	the	theoretical	justifications	for	
this	work	have	at	 least	moved	away	 from	the	biological	or	genetic	determinisms	of	Social	
																																																						
26	Lorraine	Daston	and	Peter	Galison	explain	the	term	‘mechanical	objectivity’	in	their	text	Objectivity	(MIT	
Press,	2007),	121	as	‘the	insistent	drive	to	repress	the	wilful	intervention	of	the	artist-author,	and	to	put	in	its	
stead	a	set	of	procedures	that	would,	as	it	were,	move	nature	to	the	page	through	a	strict	protocol,	if	not	
automatically’.	They	note	how	the	camera	could	‘quiet	the	observer	so	nature	could	be	heard’,	and	‘“[l]et	
nature	speak	for	itself”.	
27	Galton,	above	n	25,	135.	
28	See	e.g.	J	Willis	and	A	Todorov,	‘First	Impressions:	Making	up	your	mind	after	a	100ms	exposure	to	a	face’	
(2006)	17(7)	Psychological	Science	592;	Nalini	Ambady	and	John	Skowronski	(eds)	First	Impressions	(The	
Guilford	Press	2008);	Christopher	Y	Olivola	and	Alexander	Todorov,	‘Fooled	by	First	Impressions?	Re-examining	
the	diagnostic	value	of	appearance-based	inference’	(2010)	46(2)	Journal	of	Experimental	Social	Psychology	
315.	
29	Jeffrey	M	Valla,	Stephen	J	Ceci,	Wendy	M	Williams,	‘The	Accuracy	of	Inferences	about	Criminality	Based	on	
Facial	Appearance’	(2011)	5(2)	Journal	of	Social,	Evolutionary,	and	Cultural	Psychology	66,	68	(quoting	E.	
Berschied,	‘An	overview	of	the	psychological	effects	of	physical	attractiveness’	in	G.	Lucker	et	al	Psychological	
Aspects	of	Facial	Form	(University	of	Michigan	Press	1981)).	
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Darwinism,	 and	 is	 justified	 with	 other	 ideas.30	 Some	 explicitly	 avoid	 the	 politics	 of	
investigating	correspondences	between	personality	and	appearance	by	claiming	their	work	
interrogates	 the	pseudoscience	of	physiognomy	 in	order	 to	understand	human	 subjective	
judgments	(i.e.	stereotyping).	Others	deploy	Darwin’s	finding	of	adaptive	significance	in	the	
capacity	 to	 make	 quick	 social	 judgments	 –	 what	 is	 called	 ‘environment	 of	 evolutionary	
adaptation	studies’31	–	to	provide	an	‘ecological’	rather	than	‘biological’	theory.	On	that	basis,	
researchers	like	Valla,	Ceci	and	Williams	argue	that	‘faces,	even	in	the	absence	of	dynamic	
behaviour,	 may	 be	 informative’.32	 In	 their	 study	 of	 the	 accuracy	 of	 physiognomic	
interpretation,	they	cite	multiple	studies	showing	that	accurate	physiognomic	judgments	can	
be	 made	 by	 humans.33	 Whether	 it	 is	 genetic	 determinism,	 biased	 social	 information	
processing,	or	‘ecological’	accounts,	there	has	however,	never	emerged	a	stable	and	accepted	
physiognomic	 theory.	More	 than	 the	 success	 of	 ‘evolutionary	 adaption’	 theories,	 it	 is	 the	
absence	of	an	accepted	or	unified	theoretical	justification	that	has	become	the	mechanism	
by	 which	 these	 physiognomic	 experiments	 continue.	 Although	 the	 relationship	 between	
causation	and	correlation	in	scientific	method	is	complex,34	these	projects	seem	content,	in	
Kuhn’s	terms,	to	travel	the	road	from	scientific	law	to	measurement	in	reverse,35	and	focus	
on	correlations	entirely	unpinned	from	theoretical	accountability.	To	that	end,	explorations	
of	 facial	morphology	 through	statistical	methods	have	proliferated	and	gained	disciplinary	
legitimacy,	with	entire	fields	and	competitions	(sponsored	by	industry	actors	like	Microsoft,	
																																																						
30	See	e.g.	Alexander	Todorov,	Face	Value	(Princeton	University	Press	2017);	Thomas	Alley,	‘Physiognomy	and	
Social	Perception’	in	Thomas	Alley	(ed)	Social	and	Applied	Aspects	of	Perceiving	Faces	(Laurence	Erlbaum	
Publishers	1988),	where	he	neatly	categorises	common	approaches	in	physiognomy	including:	(a)	seeking	
resemblances	in	appearance	between	humans	and	animals,	assuming	similarities	in	appearance	indicate	
shared	psychological	qualities	(e.g.,	a	person	whose	face	is	reminiscent	of	a	fox	is	believed	to	be	sly	and	
cunning);	(b)	an	inductive	process	whereby	others	sharing	distinctive	facial	characteristics	with	a	known	
person	(or	group)	are	believed	to	share	some	of	the	familiar	person's	(group's)	psychological	characteristics;	
(c)	an	approach	based	on	functional	analogies	whereby	inferences	are	made	according	to	the	size,	shape,	or	
presence	of	facial	features	and	their	common	function(s);	and	(d)	an	approach	based	on	the	facial	expressions	
engendered	by	various	emotional	and	cognitive	states	that	looks	for	traces	of	these	expressive	facial	postures	
as	clues	to	the	common	emotional	and	cognitive	states	of	an	individual.	
31	Valla	et	al,	above	n	29.	
32	Ibid,	69.	
33	One	example	is	a	1962	study	on	inferences	of	criminality	that	claimed	success	in	replicating	Galton’s	process.	
Kozeny’s	‘Experimental	investigation	of	physiognomy	utilizing	a	photographic-statistical	method’	used	730	
criminal	portraits	to	create	composites	for	16	crime	categories,	which	were	then	physionogmically	classified	
(from	the	visual	information)	in	E	Kozeny	‘Experimentelle	Untersuchungen	zur	Ausdruckskunde	mittel	
photographisch-statisticher	Methode’	(1962)	114	Archive	für	die	gesamte	psychologie	55.	
34	See	e.g.	Roddam	Narasimha,	‘Axiomatism	and	Computational	Positivism:	Two	Mathematical	Cultures	in	
Pursuit	of	Exact	Sciences’	(2003)	38(35)	Economic	and	Political	Weekly	3650.	
35	Thomas	Kuhn,	‘The	Function	of	Measurement	in	Modern	Physical	Science’	(1961)	52(2)	Isis	161,	189-190.	
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Facebook,	Amazon	and	even	Disney)	 for	personality	 and	 social	 interaction	 typing	 through	
image	and	video	data.	With	its	capacity	to	surpass	the	visual	with	the	quantitative,	computer	
vision	represents	the	technological	boon	that	Galton	was	missing.	
	
Computational	Personality	Analysis	
	
The	success	of	machine	learning	and	particularly	convolutional	neural	networks	in	computer	
vision	mean	APA	and	APR	have	become	significant	sub-fields	 in	computer	vision	research.	
Whatever	 the	 specific	 technique,	 this	 research	 assumes	 a	 stable	 statistical	 relationships	
between	 a	 stimuli	 and	 social	 perception	 of	 personality	 (in	 APA),	 or	 true	 personality	
characteristics	 (for	 APR).36	 Whereas	 APA	 avoids	 interrogating	 the	 accuracy	 of	 its	 claims,	
instead	focusing	on	personality	traits	attributed	by	others	(often	Amazon	Turk	workers),	APR	
on	the	other	hand,	seeks	to	 identify	the	true	personality	of	the	 individual.	Although	these	
disciplines	 explore	multiple	 stimuli	 including	dynamic	 facial	 information,	 handwriting,	 and	
speech,	they	also	include	what	could	be	called	‘computational	physiognomy’.	Early	work	on	
computational	physiognomy	through	computer	vision	was	based	on	very	simplistic	models	
using	Euclidean	distances	(the	straight-line	measurement	between	2	points	 in	a	geometric	
plane)	 and	 geometric	 angles	 to	 classify	 facial	 features	 corresponding	with	 the	 pioneering	
physiognomer	Lavator’s	division	of	the	face	into	32	classes.37	Initially,	these	experiments	were	
framed	 in	 terms	 of	 investigating	 whether	 computers	 could	 replicate	 the	 trait	 evaluation	
performed	 by	 humans	 (i.e.	 first	 impressions	 analysis).	 There	 were	 no	 complex	 machine	
learning	methods,	 or	 assessments	 of	 accuracy.	 It	 was	 simply	 a	 translation	 of	 the	 task	 of	
physiognomic	measurement	 into	a	computer	vision	system.	From	that	point	however,	this	
type	 of	 personality	 computation	 became	 far	 more	 sophisticated.38	 It	 was	 not	 long	 until	
																																																						
36	Jacques	Junior	et	al,	above	n	13.	
37	Hee-Deok	Yang	and	Seong-Wang	Lee,	‘Automatic	Physiognomic	Analysis	by	Classifying	Facial	Component	
Feature’	(2006)	IEEE	The	18th	International	Conference	on	Pattern	Recognition	(ICPR'06)	–	although	they	
reference	work	statistical	work	from	1997	in	V	Dominique	et	al,	‘What	Represents	a	Face?	A	Computational	
Approach	for	the	Integration	of	Physiological	and	Psychological	Data’	(1997)	26	Perception	1271.	And	material	
on	computer	vision	for	expression	analysis	has	also	been	continuing	since	the	1990s;	See	e.g.	John	Graham,	
‘Lavater’s	“Physiognomy”:	A	Checklist’	(1961)	55(4)	The	Papers	of	the	Bibliographical	Society	of	America	297.	
This	pioneering	work	was	initially	published	in	1806.	
38	These	advances	were	typically	based	on	research	into	object	detection	using	convolutional	neural	networks	
in	A	Krizhevsky	et	al,	‘ImageNet	Classification	with	deep	convolutional	neural	networks’	(2012)	25	Proceedings	
of	Advances	in	Neural	Information	Processing	Systems	1090.	
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convolutional	 neural	 networks	 were	 predicting	 intelligence	 and	 other	 personality	
characteristics	based	on	images.39	Competitions	for	computational	personality	analysis	(both	
apparent	 and	 true)	 began	 in	 2012,	 with	 ‘deep	 learning’	 dramatically	 improving	 the	 early	
unimpressive	 results	 in	 classifier	 accuracy.40	 Deep	 learning	 enables	 ‘measurement’	 at	 a	
radically	 different	 scale	 than	 	 earlier	 classifiers	 that	 used	 engineered	 low-level	 image	
‘features’	 (like	 facial	 landmarks)	 or	 intermediate	 level	 ‘attributes’	 (like	 nose,	 glasses,	
moustache,	hair,	and	forehead	height).		
	
How	 neural	 networks	 change	 the	 basis	 of	 knowledge	 production	 as	 compared	 to	 visual	
systems	is	demonstrated	very	clearly	in	several	computer	vision	and	data	science	projects,	for	
instance	 Wu	 and	 Zhang’s	 2016	 paper	 ‘Automated	 Inference	 on	 Criminality	 Using	 Face	
Images’.41	 That	 paper	 used	 1856	 government	 ID	 images,	 about	 half	 of	 which	 included	
individuals	with	a	criminal	conviction,	as	a	dataset	for	a	criminal-propensity	classifier.42	The	
theoretical	grounding	of	this	research	is	similar	to	other	APR	exercises,	ostensibly	testing	the	
social	inference	hypothesis.43	But	the	research	is	more	revealing	in	terms	of	how	computer	
vision	systems	claim	to	generate	knowledge	about	 individuals.	Most	 telling	 is	 the	authors’	
acknowledgment	 that	 the	 variance	 between	 criminal	 and	 non-criminal	 populations	 is	 not	
evident	from	visual	assessments	or	simple	Euclidean	measurements.44	In	other	words,	visual	
information,	in	the	sense	of	information	that	is	visually	perceivable	and	interpretable,	what	
Galton	 had	 unsuccessfully	 relied	 on,	 was	 insufficient	 for	 physiognomic	 purposes.	 Only	
through	 the	 higher	 dimensional	 computational	 analysis	 of	 numerical	 quantitative	
measurements	was	this	statistical	separation	discernible.	This	finding	represents	the	premise	
and	utility	of	neural	networks	for	this	application,45	and	is	highly	illustrative	of	the	shift	from	
qualitative	visual	to	quantitative	statistical	ways	of	knowing	people.	This	change	in	the	nature	
																																																						
39	Ting	Zhang	et	al,	‘Physiognomy:	Personality	Traits	Prediction	by	Learning’	(2017)	14(4)	International	Journal	
of	Automation	and	Computing	386.	Work	of	this	type	often	uses	the	OCEAN	model	for	personality	description.	
40	Jacques	Junior	et	al,	above	n	13,	discussing	the	Interspeech,	MAPTRAITS,	WCPR	and	ChaLearn	competitions.	
41	Xiaolin	Wu	and	Xi	Zhang,	‘Automated	Inference	on	Criminality	using	Face	Images’	arXiv:1611.04135v1	
[cs.CV]	(13	Nov	2016).	
42	These	authors	built	a	criminality	classifier	not	on	the	basis	of	a	statistical	mean	as	sought	by	Galton,	but	by	
measuring	variance	from	a	non-criminal	normal	(i.e.	based	on	the	idea	that	there	is	a	greater	resemblance	in	
non-criminal	faces).	
43	Ibid	2.	
44	Ibid	6.	
45	Yann	LeCun	et	al,	‘Deep	Learning’	(2015)	521	Nature	436.	
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of	knowledge	production	 is	made	even	more	explicit	 in	Wang	and	Kosinski’s	controversial	
physiognomic	work	 ‘Deep	Neural	Networks	are	More	Accurate	 than	Humans	at	Detecting	
Sexual	Orientation	from	Facial	Images’.46		
	
That	project	used	14438	facial	 images	extracted	from	an	existing	database,	of	which	6076	
were	identifiably	gay	according	to	correlation	with	a	Facebook	Audience	Insights	platform,	
and	 self-declared	 sexual	 interest	 on	 Facebook.	 A	 deep	 neural	 network	 called	 VGG-Face	
(originally	deployed	for	facial	recognition)	that	transforms	facial	images	into	4096	particular	
scores,	was	used	for	pattern	analysis	and	classification.47	While	the	authors	begin	from	the	
proposition	that	‘DNNs	are	increasingly	outperforming	humans	in	visual	tasks	such	as	image	
classification,	facial	recognition,	or	diagnosing	skin	cancer’,48	they	ultimately	conclude	that	
‘our	 faces	 contain	 more	 information	 about	 sexual	 orientation	 than	 can	 be	 perceived	 or	
interpreted	 by	 the	 human	 brain’.49	 This	 finding	 suggests	 that	 if	 the	 data	 sets	 can	 be	
constructed,	 and	 the	 results	 are	 to	 be	 accepted,	 there	 are	 few	 limitations	 to	 what	
characteristics	might	be	inferred	from	images.		
	
There	 is	 something	 historically	 significant	 in	 physiognomy	 being	 a	 platform	 for	 the	
advancement	of	computational	empiricism.	Criminologist	Nicole	Rafter	has	brilliantly	argued	
with	respect	 to	the	earlier	 (analogue)	practices	of	physiognomy	and	phrenology	that	 their	
scientific	 invalidity	was	 insignificant	when	compared	to	 the	epistemological	paradigm	that	
they	 ushered	 in.50	 Those	 pseudo-sciences	 shifted	 how	 we	 understand	 people	 and	 their	
behaviour	away	from	metaphysics	and	theology	and	towards	‘analytical	empiricism’.	Rafter	
shows	 how	 phrenology,	 the	 discredited	 science	 of	 ‘the	 correspondences	 between	 the	
external	and	internal	man,	the	visible	superficies	and	the	invisible	contents’51	but	based	on	
reading	character	traits	from	skull	morphology,	therefore	‘produced	one	of	the	most	radical	
																																																						
46	Wang	and	Kosinski,	above	n	12.	
47	The	results	were	post-hoc	justified	with	a	prenatal	hormone	theory	(that	over	or	under	exposure	of	
androgens	during	gestation	affects	both	facial	appearance	and	sexual	orientation),	which	gave	a	biological	
foundation	to	the	statistical	findings.	
48	Ibid	247.	
49	Ibid	254.	
50	Nicole	Rafter,	‘The	Murderous	Dutch	Fiddler:	Criminology,	History	and	the	Problem	of	Phrenology’	(2005)	
9(1)	Theoretical	Criminology	65.	
51	Ibid	at	71	quoting	JC	Lavater,	‘Essays	on	Physigonomy’	Abridged	from	Mr	Holcroft’s	translation.	London:	
Printed	for	G.G.J.	&	J.	Robinson.	
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reorientations	in	ideas	about	crime	and	punishment	ever	proposed	in	the	Western	world.’52	
It	was	radical	for	its	providing	a	measurable	explanation	of	criminal	behaviour	and	other	social	
phenomena	on	the	basis	of	positivist	reasoning	with	empirical	methods,	and	it	transformed	
criminology,	penology,	and	 jurisprudence	by	changing	how	we	generate	knowledge	about	
people.	 It	 is	argued	that	the	profiling	techniques	described	above	should	be	thought	of	as	
data	points	in	the	movement	towards	computational	empiricism	as	a	dominant	knowledge	
system.	 Beyond	 ‘laundering’	 various	 ideological,	 even	 eugenicist,	 politics	 through	
technological	neutrality,53	the	claim	here	is	that	the	foundational	knowledge	claims	of	these	
technical	systems	exhibit	their	own	political,	even	philosophical,	position.		
	
Computational	physiognomy,	like	its	analogue	predecessor,	is	not	the	only	application	of	this	
empirical	 paradigm.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 best	 understood	 as	 a	 harbinger	 of	 an	 evolving	
epistemological	environment.	Other	biometric	data	science	applications	operate	on	a	similar	
knowledge-logic.	 For	 instance,	 automated	 analysis	 of	 voice	 and	 speech	 are	 being	 used	 to	
assess	ethic	origins	for	migration	assessments,54	as	well	as	making	customs	assessments	of	
migrants	 and	 tourists.55	 There	 is	 also	 a	 growing	 health-tech	 industry,	 where	 recording	 of	
particular	bodily	functions	like	sleeping	and	eating,	speaking,	or	physical	interactions	with	a	
computer	are	being	computed	into	assessments	of	physical	and	psychological	health.56	The	
accuracy	of	these	systems	is	not	going	to	determine	their	epistemological	validity.	Projects	
are	 being	 funded,	 and	 the	 political	 will	 is	 there	 to	 deploy	 them.	 The	 empirical	 sciences	
accordingly	 follow,	building	new	ways	 to	 classify	 and	 know	persons.	Data	 science,	 and	 its	
particular	systems	of	measurement	and	classification,	are	thus	becoming	the	prime-movers	
in	building	this	new	epistemological	terrain.	
	
																																																						
52	Ibid	65.	
53	Agüera	y	Arcas	et	al	above	n	15.	
54	Emily	Apter,	‘Shibboleth:	Policing	by	Ear	and	Forensic	Listening	in	Projects	by	Lawrence	Abu	Hamdan’	(2016)	
156	October	100.		
55	Douglas	Heaven,	‘An	AI	lie	detector	will	interrogate	travellers	at	some	EU	borders’,	(31	October	2018)	
NewScientist	<https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg24032023-400-an-ai-lie-detector-will-interrogate-
travellers-at-some-eu-borders/>			
56	See	e.g.	Saeed	Abdullah	and	Tanzeem	Choudhury,	‘Sensing	Technologies	for	Monitoring	Serious	Mental	
Illnesses’	(2018)	25(1)	IEEE	MultiMedia	61;	Rui	Wang	et	al,	‘Predicting	Symptom	Trajectories	of	Schizophrenia	
using	Mobile	Sensing’	(2017)	1(3)	Proceedings	of	the	ACM	on	Interactive,	Mobile,	Wearable	and	Ubiquitous	
Technologies	110.	
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Computational	Empiricism	
	
The	claim	that	nature	can	only	be	understood	through	computation	articulates	data	science	
as	an	attempt	to	access	the	hidden	mathematical	sub-structures	of	reality.	In	many	respects,	
this	claim	is	neither	unique	nor	controversial,	but	 it	remains	significant	 in	the	context	of	a	
technological	capacity	that	is	proliferating	so	rapidly	and	widely.	It	is	also	far	from	universally	
accepted.	 Some	 computer	 scientists	 sensibly	 argue	 that	 ‘deep	 learning	 can’t	 extract	
information	that	isn’t	there,	and	we	should	be	suspicious	of	claims	that	it	can	reliably	extract	
hidden	meaning	from	images	that	eludes	human	judges.’57	But	such	admissions	seem	peculiar	
when,	 really,	 deriving	 meaning	 from	 measurements	 too	 granular	 for	 non-computational	
analysis	is	the	very	premise	of	machine	learning.	Further,	as	argued,	the	accuracy	of	those	
applications	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 the	 primary	 determinant	 of	 whether	 their	 outputs	 are	
interpreted	as	“true”.	To	 that	end,	 some	have	begun	 to	argue	 that	claiming	access	 to	 the	
hidden	structures	of	reality	has	now	become	the	organizing	principle	of	data	science.58		
	
Many	 technologies	 of	 representation	 claim	 to	 reveal	 previously	 unseen	 information.	
Photography,	 for	 instance,	 was	 understood	 as	 a	 way	 to	 ‘see	 into	 nature’s	 cabinet’.59	 It	
challenged	 the	 ‘optical	unconscious’.60	Walter	Benjamin	describes	 this	access	 to	nature	as	
opening	up	‘in	this	material	the	physiognomic	aspects	of	the	world	of	images,	which	reside	in	
the	smallest	details,	clear	and	yet	hidden	enough	to	have	found	shelter	in	daydreams.’61	Other	
optical	technologies	offer	similar	narratives.	The	telescope	gave	access	to	celestial	knowledge	
–	 the	microscope	 to	cellular	knowledge.	X-ray	 imaging	and	radiographic	measurements	of	
material	 density	 afforded	 a	 ‘New	 Sight’62	 that	 could	 reveal	 ‘hidden	 existence’.63	 Roberta	
McGrath	describes	public	attitudes	around	x-rays,	noting	‘The	body	itself	is	thus	perceived	as	
																																																						
57	Agüera	y	Arcas	et	al	above	n	15,	although	those	authors	do	then	give	the	conflicting	argument	that	‘On	a	
scientific	level,	machine	learning	can	give	us	an	unprecedented	window	into	nature	and	human	behaviour,	
allowing	us	to	introspect	and	systematically	analyze	patterns	that	used	to	be	in	the	domain	of	intuition	or	folk	
wisdom.’	
58	McQuillan,	above	n	21.	
59	Roberta	McGrath,	Seeing	her	sex:	Medical	archives	and	the	female	body	(Manchester	University	Press	2002)	
114.	
60	Benjamin,	above	n	18.	
61	Ibid.	
62	‘The	New	Sight	and	the	New	Photography’,	The	Photogram	(1898).	
63	Mary	Warner	Marien,	Photography:	A	Cultural	History	(2nd	ed)	(Laurence	King	Publishing	2006),	216.	
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literally	 ghost-like,	 immaterial,	 only	 flesh,	 as	 being	 merely	 a	 thin	 veneer,	 literally	 a	 skin,	
covering	a	hidden,	deeper	reality	which	will,	like	truth,	be	uncovered,	revealed.’64	Artists	and	
intellectuals	 similarly	 responded,	 ‘Who	can	still	believe	 in	 the	opacity	of	bodies,	 since	our	
sharpened	and	multiplied	sensibilities	have	already	penetrated	the	obscure	manifestation	of	
mediums?’65	 The	 idea	 of	 the	 body	 as	 readable	 medium	 and	 material	 manifestation	 of	 a	
deeper	 informational	 truth	 is	 also	 highlighted	 in	 Mark	 Andrejevic’s	 analysis	 of	
‘neuromarketing’,	 where	 he	 describes	 how:	 ‘The	 notion	 that	 bodies	 are,	 for	 marketing	
purposes,	more	truthful	than	the	words	they	utter	is	emerging	as	a	recurring	theme	in	the	
promotion	of	neuromarketing,	which	promises	to	render	obsolete	the	allegedly	quaint	and	
outdated	techniques	of	surveys	and	focus	groups…	They	can,	thanks	to	new	technologies,	cut	
through	directly	to	the	underlying	truths	revealed	by	the	brain.’66		
	
Andrejevic	places	this	claim	within	‘The	appeal	of	techniques	for	bypassing	discursive	forms	
of	representation	(by	cutting	‘straight	to	the	brain’)’	against	 ‘the	popularised	and	reflexive	
mediated	 critiques	 of	 discursive	 forms	 of	 representation	 for	 their	 potentially	 deceptive,	
indeterminate,	and	constructed	character.’67	These	approaches	can	 thus	be	genealogically	
situated	 amongst	 the	 behavioural	 sciences,	 wherein	 the	 premise	 of	 stable	 relationship	
between	 stimuli	 and	 character	 afforded	 mechanisms	 for	 personality	 and	 behaviour	
computation	such	as	 ‘digital	phenotyping’.68	They	also	represent	an	historical	trajectory	of	
understanding	 human	 subjectivity	 as	 an	 information	pattern,69	 bound	within	 the	material	
container	 of	 the	 body	 that	 becomes	 its	 expression.	 As	 William	 Gibson	 said,	 ‘data	 made	
flesh’.70	 Computer	 vision	 and	 biometric	 data	 science	 add	 another	 dimension	 to	 these	
narratives	 however.	 Photographs,	 telescopic	 observations,	 radiographic	 photograms,	 and	
even	neuromarketing	enabled	a	form	of	discovery	that	still	requires	human	interpretation.	In	
																																																						
64	McGrath,	above	n	59,	115.	
65	Umberto	Boccioni,	quoted	in	Didier	Ottinger	(ed)	Futurism	(Centre	Pompidou	/	5	Continent	Editions	2008),	
154.		
66	Mark	Andrejevic,	‘Brain	Whisperers:	Cutting	Through	the	Clutter	with	Neuromarketing’	(2012)	2(2)	
Somatechnics	198,	199.	
67	Ibid	200.	
68	See	e.g.	Luke	Stark,	‘Algorithmic	Psychometrics	and	the	Scalable	Subject’,	(2018)	42(2)	Social	Studies	of	
Science	204.	
69	See	e.g.	Paul	Edwards,	The	Closed	World:	Computers	and	the	Politics	of	Discourse	in	Cold	War	America	(MIT	
Press	1996);	N.	Katherine	Hayles,	How	We	Became	Post-Human:	Virtual	Bodies	in	Cybernetics,	Literature	and	
Infomatics	(University	of	Chicago	Press	1999).	
70	William	Gibson,	Neuromancer	(Ace	1984).	
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computer	vision,	 the	measurement,	encoding	and	decoding,	and	knowledge	discovery	are	
increasingly	automated.	Through	machine	learning	and	neural	networks,	even	the	selection	
of	representations	–	that	is,	the	mechanisms	by	which	the	world	is	presented	for	analysis	–	is	
also	 automated.	 The	 elements	 of	 images	 from	 which	 meaning	 is	 derived,	 often	 called	
‘features’,	 are	 selected	 through	 automated	 learning	 processes	 instead	 of	 the	 laborious	
manual	process	of	‘feature	engineering’.	Through	these	processes,	the	clinical	is	replaced	with	
the	empirical,	image	comprehension	is	replaced	by	image	computation,	observation	replaced	
with	measurement,	with	the	truth	–	the	deeper	hidden	reality	–	only	becoming	available	in	
the	high-dimensionality	that	neural	networks	can	process.71	This	 is	not	the	combination	of	
inputs	from	‘multiple	large	data	sources	to	generate	new	hypotheses	about	the	way	the	world	
works	and	prescriptions	for	how	to	act	upon	that	knowledge’72	typically	associated	with	big	
data	and	predictive	analytics.	It	involves	a	deeper	belief	in	how	the	world	can	be	understood,	
premised	 on	 new	 systems	 of	 measurement,	 new	 systems	 of	 representation,	 new	
understandings	of	human	subjectivity,	and	new	forms	of	statistical	analysis.	
	
Measurement	and	Representation	
	
Accessing	the	hidden	mathematical	substructure	of	reality	requires	numbers.	Reducing	the	
real	world	to	numbers	requires	measurement.	Accordingly,	computer	vision	systems	do	not	
see	–	they	measure.	They	measure	visual	data	(x)	in	order	to	determine	a	‘world	state’	(w).73	
As	Sheila	Jasanoff	notes,	‘Any	form	of	data	collection	involves,	to	begin	with,	an	act	of	seeing	
and	recording	something	that	was	previously	hidden	and	possibly	nameless’.74	In	the	same	
way	that	photography	bypassed	the	optical	unconscious,	computer	vision	profiling	is	about	
noticing,	 measuring,	 and	 analysing	 that	 which	 was	 previously	 not	 available	 to	 human	
																																																						
71	Rob	Kitchen,	‘Big	data,	New	Epistemologies	and	Paradigm	Shifts’,	(2014)	Big	Data	and	Society	1,	at	2	where	
he	says,	‘Big	Data	analytics	enables	an	entirely	new	epistemological	approach	for	making	sense	of	the	world;	
rather	than	testing	a	theory	by	analysing	relevant	data,	new	data	analytics	seeks	to	gain	insights	“born	from	
the	data”.	
72	Sheila	Jasanoff,	‘Vitual,	Visible,	and	actionable:	Data	assemblages	and	the	sightlines	of	justice’	(2017)	4(2)	
Big	Data	and	Society	(online)	<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/2053951717724477>.		
73	Simon	JD	Prince,	Computer	Vision:	Models,	Learning	and	Inference	(Cambridge	University	Press	2012);	Note	
Rob	Kitchen,	‘Big	data,	New	Epistemologies	and	Paradigm	Shifts’,	(2014)	Big	Data	and	Society	1	where	he	
quotes	Sinan	Aral,	who	states	‘Revolutions	in	science	have	often	been	preceded	by	revolutions	in	
measurement.’	
74	Jasanoff,	above	n	72.		
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perception	and	cognition.	The	process	is	complex	however	because	the	relationship	between	
x	 and	w	 is	 not	 one-to-one.	 Photographic	 images	 are	 reductions	 of	 the	 three-dimensional	
world	 into	 a	 two-dimensional	 set	 of	 measurements.	 There	 are	 however	 multiple	
configurations	 of	 the	 three-dimensional	 world	 that	 might	 result	 in	 any	 particular	 two-
dimensional	output.	In	other	words,	‘there	may	be	many	real-world	configurations	that	are	
compatible	with	the	same	measurements.’75	Thus	the	chance	that	any	possible	world	state	is	
present	 or	 true	 is	 described	 using	 probability.	 The	 probabilistic	 techniques	 of	 statistical	
clustering	used	to	generate	meaning	about	the	world	state	typically	use	machine	learning.	
But	machine	learning	is	computationally	demanding,	and	it	cannot	operate	on	absolutely	all	
the	data	that	could	be	derived	from	an	image.	Instead,	it	is	necessary	to	marshal	selections	of	
data	into	‘representations’.	
	
When	computer	vision	emerged	as	a	discipline	in	the	1960s,	it	became	apparent	that	those	
systems	could	not	respond	to	the	totality	of	recorded	signal	(an	image).	Image	data	typically	
comes	as	RBG	values	per	pixel	inscribed	by	the	translation	(or	transduction)	of	light	energy	to	
voltage	in	a	sensor.	The	computational	resources	required	to	perform	statistical	analysis	on	
that	 amount	 of	 data	 is	 immense.	 Therefore,	 instead	 of	 ‘image	 level	 computation’,	
computational	 economy	 requires	 transformations	 into	 symbolic	 representations.76	 The	
inability	of	computer	vision	systems	to	respond	directly	to	the	totality	of	registered	signal	has	
been	 acknowledged	 by	 some	 as	 a	 failure,77	 and	 others	 as	 a	 fundamental	 limitation.78	
Nevertheless,	 it	 remains	 the	 primary	 mechanism	 by	 which	 computer	 vision	 translates	
measurements	of	the	world	into	the	computational	register.	That	means	‘features’	of	visual	
data	 have	 to	 be	 selected	 for	 analysis,	 but	 as	 noted	 above	 that	 selection	 is	 increasingly	
automated.	 In	 the	 last	 few	years	 significant	 research	has	gone	 into	ways	 to	avoid	manual	
assessments	of	images	to	identify	what	might	be	relevant	for	building	classifiers	(i.e.	feature	
engineering)	79	in	favour	of	a	statistical	pattern	recognition	that	can	identify	a	relevant	feature	
																																																						
75	Prince,	above	n	73.		
76	CM	Brown,	‘Computer	Vision	and	Natural	Constraints’	(1984)	224	Science	1299.	
77	Prince,	above	n	73.		
78	Herbert	Dreyfus,	‘Why	Heideggerian	AI	failed	and	how	fixing	it	would	require	making	it	more	Heideggarian’	
(2007)	171(18)	Artificial	Intelligence	1137,	where	he	argues	that	the	use	of	representations	rather	than	direct	
sensory	input	is	a	limiting	factor	for	artificial	intelligence.	
79	Yoshua	Bengio,	Aaron	Courville	and	Pascal	Vincent,	‘Representation	Learning:	A	Review	and	New	
Perspectives’	(2014)	arXiv:1206.5538v3	[cs.LG]	23	Apr	2014.	
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on	the	basis	of	 its	probabilistic	relationship	to	other	 features	 in	the	environment.80	This	 is	
sometimes	 called	 ‘representation	 learning’,	 where	 a	 system	 is	 fed	 with	 “raw	 data”	 ‘to	
automatically	discover	 the	 representations	needed	 for	detection	or	 classification.’81	 ‘Deep	
learning’	means	multiple	layers	of	representation,	automatically	generated,	where	each	level	
of	representation	is	more	complex	and	abstract	than	the	previous	one.	As	LeCun,	Bengio	and	
Hinton	 explain,	 ‘The	 key	 aspect	 of	 deep	 learning	 is	 that	 these	 layers	 of	 features	 are	 not	
designed	by	human	engineers:	they	are	learned	from	data	using	a	general-purpose	learning	
procedure.’82	
	
The	 inherent	 paradox	 of	 this	 epistemological	 platform	 is	 the	 use	 of	 correlation	 to	 create	
invisible	or	 inaccessible	automated	 representations	 in	order	 to	 surpass	 the	use	of	manual	
representation.	 In	 other	 words,	 overcoming	 the	 limits	 of	 representation	 with	 more	
representations.83	 Framing	 it	 this	 way	 prompts	 us	 to	 reconsider	 imagistic	 representation	
within	data	scientific	contexts.	Much	has	been	written	about	how	knowledge	is	modulated	
through	natural	representations	like	the	index	and	icon.84	But	now	similar	investigations	are	
necessary	 for	 mathematical	 imagistic	 representations	 like	 ‘functional	 representations’	 –	
where	a	function	is	fit	to	the	discrete	and	finite	set	of	measurements	that	constitute	an	image	
such	 as	 the	 pixel	 coordinates	 and	 values;	 ‘linear	 representations’	 –	 where	 images	 are	
unwound	into	a	vector	matrices;	‘spatial	frequency	representations’	–	that	measure	the	speed	
at	which	a	particular	quality	changes	across	an	image	surface;	‘relational	representations’	–	
where	 images	 are	 represented	 with	 graphs;	 and	 ‘probabilistic	 representations’	 –	 where	
mathematical	 tools	 are	 used	 to	 estimate	 the	 best	 version	 of	 a	 particular	 image	 given	 a	
measurement	 of	 a	 corrupted	 or	 noisy	 image.85	 Representation	 in	 computer	 vision	 has	
changed	into	a	project	of	finding	the	target	thing	(i.e.	the	pattern)	from	all	the	information	
within	an	image.	With	real	consequences	for	how	we	derive	meaning	from	the	visual	world.		
																																																						
80	See	e.g.	Hairong	Qi	and	Wesley	E.	Snyder,	Machine	Vision	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2004).	They	explain	
that	when	features	extracted	from	an	image	most	closely	match	features	of	a	trained	image,	then	a	simple	
statistical	(maximum	likelihood)	classifier	is	useful	for	classifying	the	content	of	an	image.	In	other	words,	the	
maximum	likelihood	approach	to	classifier	design	uses	statistical	representations	to	describe	the	probability	
that	an	object	having	a	certain	set	of	measurement	belongs	to	a	particular	class.		
81	LeCun	et	al,	above	n	45.	
82	Ibid	436.	
83	This	is	also	discussed	in	Andrejevic,	above	n	66	at	212.	
84	See	e.g.	CS	Peirce	in	Charles	Hartshorne	and	Paul	Weiss	(eds),	Collected	Papers	of	Charles	Sanders	Peirce	
(Harland	University	Press,	1932)	Volume	2,	281.	
85	Qi	above	n	80.	
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Computational	Empiricism	as	a	Dominant	Epistemology	
	
As	 society	 becomes	 more	 statistical,86	 it	 makes	 sense	 that	 both	 representation	 and	
knowledge	take	less	deterministic	forms.	However,	from	the	above,	we	can	begin	to	draw	an	
outline	of	new	forms	of	computational	empiricism	(or	positivism)	as	applied	to	understanding	
people.87	First,	it	operates	on	the	basis	that	external	measurement	or	observation	is	a	more	
reliable	pathway	to	knowledge	than	the	symbolic	output	of	a	subject.	This	is,	of	course,	not	
unique	to	these	practices	or	technologies,	it	is	simply	one	element	of	the	schema.	It	is	also	
not	 a	 uniquely	 visual	 phenomenon.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 techniques	 described	 above,	 the	
technology	of	the	stethoscope	and	the	practice	of	‘auscultation’	–	listening	to	the	body	at	a	
physical	distance	–	offers	another	useful	example	of	technological	mediation	making	the	body	
an	 object	 of	 knowledge.	 Histories	 of	 diagnostic	 practices	 with	 stethoscopes	 have	 been	
invoked	to	demonstrate	the	movement	from	theoretical	to	perceptual	ways	of	knowing	the	
body,	achieved	through	the	combination	of	rationality	and	empiricism.88	This	line	of	thinking	
describes	 the	 ascendance	 of	 empiricism	 in	 this	 (medical)	 context	 as	 entwined	 with	 the	
construction	of	a	new	subject,	and	productive	of	a	new	medical	epistemology	of	pathological	
anatomy.89	The	updating	of	remote	sensing	in	medical	applications	with	new	sensors	and	data	
science	 is	 similarly	 oriented	 towards	 constructing	 epistemologies	 of	 pathological	
behaviours.90	However,	empirical	data	science	engages	with	a	different	human	subject	from	
																																																						
86	Hacking,	above	n	16.	
87	Note	the	term	‘computational	empiricism’	was	used	by	Paul	Humphries	in	‘Computational	Empiricism’	in	Bas	
C.	van	Fraasen	(ed)	Topics	in	the	Foundation	of	Statistics	(1997,	Springer)	at	119,	where	he	discussed	the	idea	
in	the	context	of	changing	scientific	methods	associated	with	the	adoption	of	powerful	instrumentation	and	
powerful	computational	devices.	His	point	is	to	suggest	notions	of	‘logical	empiricism’	require	updating	by	
computationally	oriented	methods.	The	term	‘computational	positivism’	is	best	described	in	Narasimha,	above	
n	34,	where	he	uses	the	term	to	describe	methodologies	in	exact	sciences	and	mathematics	that	focus	on	
matching	algorithms	to	observations	rather	than	drawing	conclusions	from	axioms	and	models.		
88	See	Jonathan	Sterne,	‘Mediate	Auscultation,	the	Stethoscope,	and	the	“Autopsy	of	the	Living”:	Medicine’s	
Acoustic	Culture’	(2001)	22(2)	Journal	of	Medical	Humanities	115,	where	he	locates	this	in	the	work	of	
Michelle	Foucault’s	The	Birth	of	the	Clinic	(1973,	Pantheon	Books),	and	S.J.	Reiser’s	Medicine	and	the	reign	of	
Technology	(1978,	Cambridge).	
89	Ibid	117.	
90	See	e.g.	Saeed	Abdullah	and	Tanzeem	Choudhury,	‘Sensing	Technologies	for	Monitoring	Serious	Mental	
Illnesses’	(2018)	25(1)	IEEE	MultiMedia	61;	Rui	Wang	et	al,	‘Predicting	Symptom	Trajectories	of	Schizophrenia	
using	Mobile	Sensing’	(2017)	1(3)	Proceedings	of	the	ACM	on	Interactive,	Mobile,	Wearable	and	Ubiquitous	
Technologies	110.	
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those	 older	 techniques,	 one	 that	 is	 simultaneously	 interpreted	 and	 constructed	 an	
informational	pattern	rather	than	embodied	puzzle.	
	
A	second	element	to	 the	schematic	 is	a	specific	 type	of	computational	 intervention	 in	 the	
relationship	between	measurement	and	classification.	On	one	hand,	computational	systems	
differ	from	other	representational	technologies	because	of	their	capacity	to	both	measure	
and	process	quantities	of	data	that	are	too	large	for	human	tabulation,	too	discrete	for	human	
perception,	and	too	complex	for	human	cognitive	analysis.	This	is	also	not	unique	to	computer	
vision	or	data	science.	Where	these	techniques	differ	however,	is	the	degree	of	automation	
in	 the	selection	of	elements	 (or	 features	or	dimensions)	of	a	measurement	deemed	to	be	
meaningful.	In	other	words,	decisions	about	what	elements	of	a	measurement	inform	each	
layer	of	representation	are	increasingly	displaced	into	automated	learning	systems.	Those	are	
highly	political	decisions	about	how	the	real	world	is	translated	into	the	symbolic	register	of	
computation,	and	are	handed	off	to	automated	systems.	Of	course,	humans	participate	 in	
selecting	 input	data	 (i.e.	what	 the	 sensor	 captures)	 and	defining	 the	 accuracy	of	 outputs,	
which	each	participate	in	tuning	the	selection	of	representations	and	their	parameters	(i.e.	
weightings),	 but	 the	 process	 of	 producing	 representations	 is	 dissimulated	 into	 the	
architecture	of	the	system.	
	
A	 third	element	 is	a	belief	 that	 this	process	 is	working	 towards	exposing	 the	 fundamental	
substructures	 of	 reality.	 The	 belief	 that	 increasingly	 granular	 measurement	 and	 high	
dimensionality	analysis	has	the	capacity	to	reveal	hidden	truths	is	visible	to	a	greater	or	lesser	
degree	 in	 research	 projects	 using	 high	 resolution	 sensors	 and	 learning	 applications.	 This	
computational	 variant	 of	 realism	 has	 been	 described	 by	 Dan	 McQuillan	 as	 ‘machinic	
neoplatansim’.91	 That	 is,	 a	metaphysical	 commitment	 to	 a	world	 of	 truth,	 form,	 and	 idea	
existing	 behind,	 and	 only	 imperfectly	 imprinting	 on,	 the	 world	 of	 the	 humanly	 sensible,	
accessible	 only	 through	 mathematics.	 Rather	 than	 being	 a	 specific	 tool	 or	 method,	 for	
McQuillan,	data	science	thus	represents	an	automated	and	applied	philosophy,	maintaining	
an	epistemological	reverence	for	‘[a]	hidden	layer	of	reality	which	is	ontologically	superior,	
																																																						
91	McQuillan,	above	n	21,	261.	
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expressed	mathematically	and	apprehended	by	going	against	direct	experience.’92	None	of	
these	observations	are	unique	to	technologies	of	computer	vision,	the	practices	of	machine	
learning,	 or	 the	 disciplines	 of	 data	 science.	 However,	 when	 schematised	 and	 directed	 at	
understanding	people,	they	represent	an	idiosyncratic	system	of	knowledge	production	that	
challenges	the	way	legal	narratives	(as	well	as	many	others)	have	been	deployed	to	protect	
individuals	in	the	context	of	online	profiling.	
	
Law	in	the	World	State	
	
A	classic	critique	of	technology	insists	that	technological	mediation	inhibits	access	to	‘the	real’	
or	‘the	event’.	In	the	case	of	photography	for	instance,	we	are	reminded	that	the	images	we	
create,	 while	 supposed	 to	 be	 windows	 or	 maps	 for	 understanding	 the	 world	 around	 us,	
actually	operate	more	like	‘screens’.	Rather	than	expose	the	truth	of	the	world,	our	images	
saturate	the	world,	producing	a	veneer	under	which	‘the	real’	slowly	decays.	A	form	of	this	
critique	is	often	levelled	at	digital	profiling,	wherein	data	produced	through	interactions	with	
information	environments	are	used	as	proxies	for	defining	characteristics	about	us.	That	is	
the	world	of	actuarial	risk	assessment	and	the	‘scored	society’.	Critiques	of	those	technologies	
describe	how	such	 ‘scores’	 inadequately	capture	or	represent	 individuals.	Proxies	result	 in	
reduction,	distortion	and	error.93	Justin	Clemens	and	Adam	Nash	offer	a	useful	account	of	this	
process	wherein	information	‘must	first	be	digitised	to	data,	then	modulated	between	storage	
and	display	in	an	endless	protocol-based	negotiation	that	both	severs	any	link	to	the	data’s	
semantic	 source	 and	 creates	 an	 ever-growing	 excess	 of	 data	 weirdly	 related	 to,	 but	
ontologically	distinct	from,	its	originating	data	source.’94	 In	other	words,	the	mathematical	
codes	and	conventions	used	to	analyse	and	parse	already	hyper-mediated	digital	information	
omit	 or	marginalise	 their	 ‘natural’	 starting	 point.	 Clemens	 and	Nash	 thus	 claim	 that	 only	
through	modulation	 into	a	display	register	does	digital	 information	obtain	meaning.95	This	
intervention	frames	the	harm	to	persons	from	profiling	in	terms	of	loss.	It	also	grounds,	for	
																																																						
92	Ibid.	
93	See	e.g.	Cathy	O’Neil,	Weapons	of	Math	Destruction	(Crown	Books	2016);	Virginia	Eubanks,	Automating	
Inequality	(St	Martins	Press	2018).	
94	Justin	Clemens	and	Adam	Nash,	‘Being	and	Media:	Digital	Ontology	after	the	Event	of	the	End	of	Media’	
(2015)	24	The	Fibreculture	Journal	6,	9.	
95	Ibid	10.	
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instance,	 data	 protection’s	 animating	 principle	 of	 ‘transparency’.	 Legal	 narratives	 around	
transparency,	 particularly	 in	 the	 context	 of	 data	 protection,	 emerged	 to	 deal	 with	 that	
potential	 for	misrepresentation,	 inaccuracy,	 or	 distortion	 in	 cases	 where	 individuals	 are	
transcribed	into	computational	systems	and	categorised	(i.e.	profiled)	on	the	basis	of	pattern	
analysis.	Data	subject	rights	of	access	and	rectification	are	thus	deployed	to	help	individuals	
maintain	the	‘borderlines	of	meaning’	about	themselves	as	data	is	disclosed	and	processed	
across	 contexts.96	 However,	 as	 technical	 narratives	 change,	 they	 also	 challenge	 this	 legal	
mechanism.	
	
The	scores	and	proxies	used	in,	for	example,	computer	vision	profiling	are	of	a	different	class	
and	scale	than	those	used	in	actuarial	analysis	and	other	forms	of	data	mining.	The	scores	of	
‘behavioural	computation’	and	‘personality	computation’	take	the	shape	of	a	ledger,	through	
which	 behavioural	 characteristics	 can	 be	 collated.97	 Through	 its	 new	 epistemological	
program,	 data	 science	 then	 starts	 to	 move	 from	 a	 logic	 of	 ‘approximation’	 to	 a	 logic	 of	
‘revelation’.	From	the	computational	empiricist	position	in	which	the	quantitative	is	the	path	
to	knowledge,	the	world	of	infinite	possibility	now	exists	in	the	data	rather	than	in	the	human	
spirit.	 The	 ‘natural’	 starting	 point	 is	 no	 longer	 omitted,	 but	 rather	 measured	 in	 a	
dimensionality	 that	 humans	 can	 neither	 access	 nor	 interpret.	 Profiling	 systems	 claiming	
deeper	 knowledge	 about	 persons	 thus	 challenge	 the	 utility	 of	 transparency	 as	 a	 legal	
narrative	and	dismiss	the	role	of	the	captured	subject	in	forming	their	own	identity.	Thinking	
through	 how	 law	 or	 any	 other	 system	 of	 governance	 might	 address	 these	 technologies	
accordingly	means	 attending	 to	 this	 re-arrangement	 of	 technological	 practice	 and	 how	 it	
constructs	persons.		
	
Legal	thinking	has	so	far	responded	to	these	technologies	and	techniques	in	different	ways.	
One	register	seeks	improvement	of	automated	systems’	encoding	of	the	world.	The	goal	is	to	
achieve	a	 ‘fairer’	computational	translation	of	the	real	world	by	exposing	and	limiting	bias	
and	 prejudice.	 Unfair	 discrimination	 can	 find	 its	 way	 into	 automated	 systems	 in	multiple	
																																																						
96	Lee	Bygrave,	‘Privacy	and	Data	Protection	in	an	international	perspective’,	(2010)	56(8)	Scandinavian	Studies	
in	Law	165.	
97	See	e.g.	Vlad	Savov,	‘Google’s	Selfish	Ledger	is	an	Unsettling	Vision	of	Silicon	Valley	Social	Engineering’	(17	
May	2018)	The	Verge	available	<https://www.theverge.com/2018/5/17/17344250/google-x-selfish-ledger-
video-data-privacy>.	
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ways,98	 and	 improving	 the	 outcomes	 of	 automated	 decision	 systems	 remains	 critically	
important.	 But	 scholars	 like	 Frank	 Pasquale	 have	 begun	 to	 ask	 whether	 this	 form	 of	
accountability	 adequately	 considers	 the	 question	 of	 ‘accountability	 to	 whom’.99	 Without	
proper	 attention	 to	 that	 question,	 this	 form	 of	 accountability	 risks	 becoming	 part	 of	 the	
feedback	mechanism	 that	 continually	 improves	 and	 thus	 proliferates	 automated	 decision	
making	through	legal	optimisation.100	Yarden	Katz	similarly	comments	that	‘If	AI	runs	society,	
then	 grievances	 with	 society’s	 institutions	 can	 get	 reframed	 as	 questions	 of	 “algorithmic	
accountability.”	 This	 move	 paves	 the	 way	 for	 AI	 experts	 and	 entrepreneurs	 to	 present	
themselves	 as	 the	 architects	 of	 society.’101	 Fairness	 and	 accountability	 through	 decision	
system	optimisation	thus	fail	to	address	the	problem	that	computational	empiricism	should	
be	understood	as	simply	one	way	of	knowing,	especially	when	applied	to	persons.	Rather	than	
challenge	the	dominance	of	computational	empiricism,	‘fairness’	projects	focused	exclusively	
on	system	improvement	risk	law	becoming	enrolled	in	data	science’s	politics	of	completion.	
As	Joshua	Scannell	notes,	 ‘it	 is	not	at	all	clear	that	biometric	accountability,	accuracy,	and	
fairness	are	mechanisms	for	achieving	justice,	or	even	a	baseline	common	humanity.	That	is	
not	what	biometric	systems	do.	Instead,	they	reflect	the	institutional	demands	of	the	entities	
that	employ	them	—	demands	that	are	always	intended	to	sort	people	into	those	with	access	
or	without;	secured	by	or	made	insecure	by	the	state;	capacitated	or	incapacitated	by	a	credit	
score.’102	
	
Another	legal	register	challenges	specific	applications	of	data	science	on	ethical	or	political	
grounds.	This	legal	mode	identifies	where	data	science	applications	have	too	pernicious	an	
																																																						
98	Solon	Borocas	and	Andrew	Selbst,	‘Big	Data’s	Disparate	Impact’	(2016)	California	Law	Review	104.	
99	Frank	Pasquale	‘Odd	Numbers’	in	Real	Life	Magazine	(20	Aug	2018),	<http://reallifemag.com/odd-
numbers/>.		
100	In	other	words,	often	highlighting	bias	participates	in	the	positive	feedback	relationship	that	proliferates	
automated	decision	making	and	computational	empiricism	as	knowledge	systems	–	In	Flusser,	above	n	19,	this	
is	identified	as	the	program	of	the	camera	at	(46).	When	bias	is	exposed	in	contemporary	systems,	industry	
moves	to	improve	their	decision	making	systems.	See	e.g.	Dan	Thorp-Lancaster,	‘Microsoft	improves	facial	
recognition	error	rates	across	skin	tones,	gender’	(26	June	2018)	
<https://www.windowscentral.com/microsoft-improves-facial-recognition-error-rates-across-skin-tones-
gender>.			
101	Yarden	Katz,	‘Manufacturing	an	Artificial	Intelligence	Revolution’	
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3078224>		
102	Joshua	Scannell	‘Controlled	Measures’	in	Real	Life	Magazine	(17	September	2018)	
<http://reallifemag.com/controlled-measures/>.		
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3284598 
	 23	
effect	on	society	according	to	liberal	democratic	values.103	This	is	typically	a	more	traditional	
‘privacy’	 mechanism	 defending	 the	 fundamental	 dignity	 and	 opacity	 of	 persons	 against	
overreaching	 applications.	 These	 projects	 similarly	 deploy	 their	 force	 at	 the	 level	 of	
application	rather	than	at	the	epistemological	or	political	bases	of	computational	empiricism.	
Beyond	 abandoning	 or	 optimising	 the	 technologies	 however,	 there	 remains	 an	 important	
space	 for	demonstrating	the	contingency	of	computational	empiricism’s	knowledge	claims	
and	challenging	data	science’s	move	from	‘metadata’	to	‘metaphysics’.104	This	is	what	Mireille	
Hildebrandt,	for	instance,	means	when	she	talks	of	‘speaking	law	to	the	power	of	statistics’105	
–	a	program	of	re-inscribing	uncertainty	into	automated	knowledge	production.		
	
Law	and	Computer	Vision	Profiling	
	
There	are	already	important	legal	limitations	on	automated	decision	making	and	automated	
profiling	in,	for	instance,	the	GDPR.	Alongside	well	explored	‘access	and	rectification	rights’,106	
and	 the	 fundamental	principles	of	processing	 in	Article	5,107	Article	22	gives	data	 subjects	
rights	 to	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 automated	 profiling	 decisions	 based	 solely	 on	 automated	
processing	 where	 those	 decisions	 produce	 legal	 or	 similar	 effects.	 There	 are	 numerous	
limitations	 to	 that	 latter	 provision,	 including	 explicit	 consent,	 enabling	 legislation,	 or	
satisfaction	 of	 a	 contract.108	 What	 constitutes	 legal	 or	 similar	 effects,	 as	 well	 as	 purely	
automated	 processing,	 are	 also	 unclear.	 That	 a	 human	 decision	 maker	 anywhere	 in	 the	
process	 might	 remove	 an	 automated	 system	 from	 the	 purview	 of	 the	 Article	 seems	 a	
problematic	 limitation,	 especially	 considering	 the	 growing	 evidence	 that	 human	 decision	
makers	rarely	contest	the	outcomes	of	decision	support	systems.	Further,	guidance	by	the	
Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	will	be	essential	to	a	more	complete	understanding	of	
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these	 provisions.	 A	 right	 to	 ‘explanation’	 has	 also	 been	 read	 into	 Art	 15(1)(h),	 producing	
rigorous	debate	over	what	the	Article	truly	affords	data	subjects,	and	how	useful	it	may	be.109	
While	a	similar	(and	arguably	broader)	provision	has	been	in	place	since	1995,	a	broad	reading	
may	 give	 data	 subjects	 useful	 mechanisms	 for	 not	 only	 understanding,	 but	 properly	
contesting	and	challenging	automated	decisions.	However,	it	still	places	a	substantial	impetus	
on	the	data	subject	to	protect	its	own	rights,	and	only	indirectly	challenges	the	knowledge	
logic	 of	 computational	 empiricism.	 Explainability	 may	 even	 be	 harmful	 if	 entrenching	
automated	decision	making	and	narrowing	the	types	of	reasons	to	be	given	for	decisions	and	
thus	 the	 grounds	 for	 contestation. Being	 subjected	 to	 automated	 decisions	 without	
understanding	 how	 or	 why	 that	 decision	 was	 made	 may	 be	 problematic.	 But	 receiving	
inadequate	 automated	 explanations	 without	 recourse	 might	 be	 worse.	 In	 that	 format,	
‘explanation’	similarly	becomes	a	legal	vector	for	proliferating	decision	automation.	However,	
other	 approaches	 appear	 to	 more	 directly	 challenge	 data	 science’s	 epistemological	
dominance.	
	
Hildebrandt,	for	instance,	outlines	several	concepts	that	challenge	data	science’s	program	of	
quantification	 –	 what	 she	 describes	 as	 the	 ‘overcomplete	 datafication	 of	 anything	 and	
everything	based	on	the	idea	that	the	mathematics	that	grounds	all	these	machines	reveals	
the	ultimate	layer	of	a	hidden	reality.’110	She	offers	a	right	to	human	non-computability	built	
on	the	philosophical	principle	of	 indeterminate	 identity.	This	 is	not	necessarily	a	return	to	
older	opacity	paradigms	of	privacy,	a	relocation	of	the	black	box	to	the	level	of	the	individual,	
but	rather	a	mechanism	for	limiting	certain	classes	of	knowledge	claims.	It	is	achieved	in	her	
vision	through	‘agonistic’	machine	learning	systems,	capable	of	‘demanding	that	companies	
or	governments	that	base	decisions	on	machine	learning	must	explore	and	enable	alternative	
ways	 of	 datafying	 and	modelling	 the	 same	 event,	 person	 or	 action.’111	 Agonistic	 systems	
would	 demonstrate	 how	 each	 act	 of	 computation	 relies	 on	 a	 specific	 system	 of	
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measurements,	representations,	and	analytics.	Rather	than	challenging	human	computability	
wholesale,	the	project	highlights	how	humans	can	be	computed	in	multiple	ways,	in	order	to	
‘ward	 off	 monopolistic	 claims	 about	 the	 ‘true’	 or	 the	 ‘real’	 representation	 of	 human	
beings’.112	This	 is	arguably	also	a	form	of	explanation	and	accountability,	but	one	targeted	
more	appropriately	at	the	decision	making	process	itself	rather	than	the	relationship	between	
input	and	outcome	(i.e.	counter-factual	analysis).	In	other	words,	an	explanation	mechanism	
informing	 how	 to	 transcend	 the	 solution	 space	 of	 any	 particular	 decision.	 This	 type	 of	
mechanism	is	appealing	because	it	more	directly	addresses	the	construction	of	the	human	
subject	 as	 information	 pattern.	 It	 also	 recognises	 the	 significance	 of	 representations	 in	 a	
manner	similar	to	technical	approaches	like	‘disentangling	the	factors	of	variation’	in	order	to	
produce	 ‘disentangled	 representations’.113	What	 this	 manner	 of	 legal	 intervention	 would	
actually	look	like	requires	more	legal,	conceptual,	and	technical	thinking	however.	But	it	at	
least	offers	a	pathway	to	envisioning	new	projects	built	for	a	technical	age	that	sees	humans	
in	a	very	different	way	than	our	existing	legal	systems	insist	on	seeing	them.	
	
Conclusion	
	
This	article	has	attempted	to	outline	some	emerging	challenges	produced	by	a	profound	new	
technical	 capacity.	 Lawmakers	 now	 have	 to	 contend	 with	 a	 radically	 extrapolated	
enlightenment	philosophy	insisting	that	measuring	everything	and	drawing	knowledge	from	
those	measurements	 is	 the	path	 to	 truth.	Permitting	such	measurement	and	classification	
without	 limitation	 risks	 generating	 a	 fair,	 transparent,	 and	 non-prejudicial	 totalitarianism.	
This	has	been	described	as	the	‘insanity	proper	to	logic’,	whereby	measuring	everything,	logic	
conceives	 ‘a	world	 in	which	all	 things	are	 relative,	makes	 itself	 absolute,	 and	denying	 the	
whole	of	nature,	establishes	its	own	artifices.’114	Addressing	this	reality	means	clarifying	how	
computer	vision	systems	and	data	science	applications	are	merely	apparatuses,	combining	
and	 computing	 symbols	 that	 encode	 the	 world	 a	 particular	 way,	 according	 to	 particular	
programs.	Without	intervention	at	that	level,	digital	systems	risk	simultaneously	constituting	
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both	the	world	and	the	dominant	understanding	of	 it.115	As	Flusser	reminds	us,	 if	humans	
cease	to	decode	technical	images	and	instead	project	them	unencoded	back	onto	the	world	
‘out	 there’,	 the	 world	 ‘itself	 becomes	 like	 an	 image	 –	 a	 context	 of	 scenes,	 of	 states	 of	
things.’116	Critiquing	data	science	therefore	means	exposing	the	difference	between	world	
and	the	 ‘world	state’,	and	challenging	the	 idea	that	such	systems	access	a	 ‘hidden	reality’	
instead	of	producing	and	operationalise	a	para-reality	built	from	para-visual	representations.		
	
Computer	vision	has	been	presented	as	one	vector	of	that	knowledge	logic,	and	one	target	of	
a	new	kind	of	legal	thinking.	However,	this	is	certainly	not	the	case	for	computer	vision	alone.	
It	 is	 relevant	 for	 any	data	 science	application	 translating	 the	 real	world	 into	 the	 symbolic	
register	 of	 computation.	 The	 goal	 is	 to	 open	 up	 space	 for	 legal	 ideas	 that	 introduce	
contingency	 and	 automated	 un-decidability	 into	 those	 translations	 that	 are	 building	 the	
environments	ordering	 social	 experience.	 Such	projects	 seem	more	 and	more	 imperative,	
especially	 in	 the	 face	of	a	new	 form	of	computational	empiricism	designed	 for	 ‘looking	at	
people’.	
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